Um novo Plano Marshall?

No passado dia 3 de Julho, um conjunto de pesos pesados da política europeia, entre os quais Mário Soares e Jorge Sampaio, publicou uma espécie de manifesto onde se propunha um «plano para salvar o euro», inspirado no new deal do pós-guerra (texto, em inglês, no fim deste post).

O facto foi noticiado mas sem que tenha tido grande eco, pelo menos aparentemente. Mas teve algum: Mark Mazower, em artigo publicado em The Guardian três dias depois e retomado aqui, vem afirmar que «para sair da crise da dívida a longo prazo, a Europa precisa de um programa tão ambicioso como o do pós-guerra, patrocinado pelos EUA. Mas, desta vez, tem que encontrar os recursos internamente e promover uma redistribuição em todo o continente».

Será um novo Plano Marshall viável? Mazower pensa que sim e recorda que, comparados «com os problemas da Europa de então, os actuais são uma pálida insignificância».

Além disso, em teoria, os dirigentes europeus podem tomar as medidas que quiserem para regular os bancos privados e outras instituições financeiras e as suas hesitações reflectem apenas uma grande ambivalência na concepção que têm dos seus poderes: «o maior obstáculo para uma governação eficaz reside aí – na cabeça dos próprios políticos».

Mas desta vez, e ao contrário do que aconteceu depois da Segunda Guerra Mundial, terão de ser os europeus a salvarem-se a si próprios. «Serão capazes? O relógio não pára.»

A plan to save the euro and curb speculators

By Giuliano Amato and Guy Verhofstadt

Europe is losing a war between its elected governments and unelected rating agencies. Governments are trying to govern, but the rating agencies still rule. Electorates know this, which is why some European Union member states oppose fiscal transfers to others.

Yet such states, and notably Germany, gain from the euro. Its value is lower than would have been the case for an alternative “core” eurozone of fewer countries, making exports more competitive. Defaults by the eurozone’s most debt-exposed countries would hit banks and pension funds in both the core and the periphery. No one is immune.

The answer is not less Europe, but more. Both Jean-Claude Juncker, president of the Ecofin and Eurogroup councils of finance ministers, and Giulio Tremonti, Italian minister of finance, have argued that a conversion of a share of national debt to EU bonds would stabilise the current crisis. We agree.

But such a decision need not be unanimous. It could be by a voluntary process of enhanced co-operation, as was the case with the creation of the euro itself. States that wished to retain their own bonds could do so.

We agree also with the Juncker-Tremonti case that European bond issues could be globally traded, and attract surpluses from the central banks of emerging economies and sovereign wealth funds. These financial inflows into the eurozone would strengthen it and could fund growth and cohesion without fiscal transfers between member states.

We would suggest, however, that the conversion of a share of national debt to the EU need not be traded. It could be held by the EU itself. Since it was not traded, this debt would be ringfenced from rating agencies, and its interest rate could be decided on a sustainable basis by Eurogroup finance ministers. In this way it would be immune from speculation. Governments would govern rather than rating agencies rule.

We also suggest that there are lessons to be learnt from the Roosevelt bond financed “New Deal” of the 1930s, which inspired the 1993 proposal by Jacques Delors, former president of the European Commission, to match a common currency with common EU bonds.

The bonds, which mainly funded the New Deal were not financed or guaranteed by American states. The Roosevelt administration demanded no fiscal transfers from them, and it did not buy out their debt.

In the same way, the EU need not do so to issue Eurobonds. The European Investment Bank has issued bonds successfully for 50 years without debt buy-outs, national guarantees or fiscal transfers.

US Treasury bonds are financed by a federal fiscal policy. Europe does not have one. But the member states whose share of national debt was converted to EU bonds could service it at lower and sustainable rates from their national tax revenues, without fiscal transfers from others.

Europe also has an overlooked advantage. Many EU member states are deeply indebted after salvaging banks. But the Union itself has next to no debt. Even with the buy-outs of bank and national debt since May last year, its own is scarcely 1 per cent of EU gross domestic product. This is less than a 10th of the level from which the US issued the bonds that financed the New Deal.

Equally, EU bonds would not necessarily need a new institution. A ringfenced bond could be held by the existing European financial stability facility. The EFSF could conduct net Eurobond issues and co-finance projects with the EIB.

The EIB already has macro potential. Its project financing is more than double that of the World Bank. The new Eurobonds could be serviced by revenues from such co-finance of projects.

Bonds are not printing money. They are not deficit finance. They do not need fiscal transfers between states. Net bond issues would see new inflows of funds to finance recovery, rather than austerity. We urge Europe’s leaders to recognise this case, both to stabilise the euro and deliver a New Deal for Europe.

This article is also co-authored by Enrique Baron, Stuart Holland, Michel Rocard, Jan Pronk, Jorge Sampaio, Mario Soares and Jacek Saryusz-Wolski. Giuliano Amato, Michel Rocard, Mario Soares and Guy Verhofstadt were formerly heads of government of Italy, France, Portugal and Belgium. Mario Soares was president of Portugal, as was Jorge Sampaio. Enrique Baron is a former president of the European Parliament. Stuart Holland was formerly a Labour MP and an adviser to Jacques Delors. Guy Verhofstadt is leader of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats in the European Parliament. Jan Pronk is a former Dutch minister and was head of the UN Mission in Sudan from 2004-06. Jacek Saryusz-Wolski is an MEP and former vice-president of the European Parliament.

.